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Abstract
This paper empirically examines whether the act of deciding to support a political party
can impact partisan leanings years later. We use the discontinuity in the probability of being
registered to vote around the 18th birthday to look at the impact of registration after the 9/11/01
attacks on party of registration. We rst show that 9/11 increased Republican registration by
approximately 2%. Surprisingly, these di¤erences in registration patterns fully persist over the
two year period from 2006 to 2008, even for a group of registrants who moved and changed their
registration address. We nd full persistence for those registered in zip codes within two miles
of a four year university, suggesting that persistence is unlikely to be explained by lack of easy
access to or inability to process information. Instead, we suggest an interpretation of our ndings
based upon either cognitive or social biases.
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1 Introduction
Modern liberal theories of democracy are predicated upon rational discourse and a free ow of in-
formation1. According to such theories, the importance of discussion is to inform individuals and
help them make rational decisions over policy. Rational informed decision-making is critical when
voters directly decide on public policy as they do in ballot initiatives. However, it is also important
in the choice of representatives, as well as in disciplining representatives to choose reasonable poli-
cies. There is a remarkable degree of persistence in political a¢ liations, which is hard to reconcile
with underlying economic incentives, access to information, or cultural background. For instance,
the generation which became eligible to vote during the time of the popular Republican President
Eisenhower tends to be more pro-Republican even today2. In contrast, the generation that came
of age during the popular Democratic administrations of Franklin Delano Roosevelt remains to this
day unusually pro-Democrat. This di¤erence between these two groups of voters remains despite
similarity in underlying economic incentives on policy: almost all voters in both groups are recipients
of Social Security and Medicare and most from both groups are retired. Another example is that
partisan realignments happen very slowly. When Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act, he
proclaimed that the Democratic Party had "lost the South for a generation". In fact, it was not until
a generation later that the Democrats lost the South. Clear persistent support for the Republican
party amongst Southern whites did not appear until 1994 (Black and Black, 2003).
In this paper, we attempt to understand what factors help explain this persistence in political
partisanship. In particular, we develop an empirical strategy that allows us to test whether the
mere act of registering for a political party today can a¤ect future politics by causing a persistent
and enduring support for that party. We analyze whether an individuals choice of political party
is consistent with rational learning about the political environment or whether cognitive and social
factors shape political preferences. In doing so, we suggest that this persistence may dampen political
1The idea that sharing information, promoting discussion and deliberating consequences is key to a successfully
functioning democracy goes back at least to the original publication of The Human Condition by Hannah Arendt in
1958. The importance of rational communication was expanded upon by Habermas (1987). A good overview of some
recent contributions is provided by Elster (1998).
2http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2006/10/14/weekinreview/15kirk_graphic.ready.html?
scp=4&sq=today%27s%20voters:%20how%20generation%20inuences%20party&st=cse
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competition and be a source of persistence in policy.
Empirically estimating the impact of voter registration on the evolution of voter beliefs is not
straightforward. Individuals who register for a party are likely to have personal characteristics which
a¤ect their registration decision. High income earners tend to vote Republican (Gelman, 2008); high
income earners today are also likely to be high income earners tomorrow. Thus, high income earners
are likely to be Republican today and tomorrow. Moreover, the underlying determinants of political
partisanship, whether economic or familial, may persist and thus lead to persistence in partisanship.
In this paper we argue that the September 11 attacks on the United States provides us with a natural
experiment that allows us to test the e¤ect of the initial registration decision on the evolution of
political partisanship.
There is a large increase in registration of rst time voters around their 18th birthday. This leads
to a discontinuity in the probability (a fuzzy discontinuity) of rst registering after a given date. In
the case of the September 11 attacks, the discontinuity in the probability of rst registering to vote
after 9/11/01 leads to a discontinuity in the probability of registering initially for the Republican
party. Those who, based upon birth date alone, are more likely to register after 9/11/01 are ap-
proximately 2% more likely to register Republican. We measure the initial e¤ect using 2006 data.
Surprisingly, this gap remains roughly constant over the 2 year time period in our data: from 2006
through to 2008. In fact, we can not reject the initial choice of party due to small random di¤erences
in birth date is fully persistent.
We estimate our regression discontinuity using local linear semi-parametric regression. However,
our discontinuity design is robust to controlling for linear trends in birth date separately on either
side of the discontinuity. Our identifying assumption is that registrants born just before the discon-
tinuity date are not on average di¤erent from registrants born just after the discontinuity except in
their probability of having registered for the rst time after September 11, 2001. Our main iden-
tication concern, therefore, is that persistence in political a¢ liation is due not to the act of voter
registration per se, but driven instead by other underlying factors such as future expected income
or family background which di¤er systematically for registrants born on either side of the birth date
discontinuity. However, our identifying assumption is supported by several placebo tests. These
include tests for balance of covariates, including demographic characteristics, across the threshold
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and tests for continuity of the density of registrants across the threshold.
Our main result is quite striking. We nd that taking a political position such as a decision to
register (or not register) for a political party, can in and of itself be a critical determinant of future
political identity. Our point estimates are generally very close to full persistence. For our most
precise results, results on persistence of Republican registration, we can reject a 50 % reversion over
two years. Persistence is not restricted to those with party a¢ liations but also to independents,
suggesting that the electorate may be divided into swing and partisan voters. This suggests a
di¤erent model of voter behavior from canonical models where the probability of voting for either
of two parties is continuously distributed across the population.
In addition to the political ndings of our results, we also use our results to provide three
possible explanations for our results: costly information acquisition or processing, social biases and
cognitive biases. Simple rational Bayesian updating is not consistent with our ndings. With
costless acquisition and processing of information there should not be any systematic di¤erences in
the percent of the population registering Republican across the birth date discontinuity, which is
contradicted by our baseline results. Even costly information acquisition or processing models are
di¢ cult to reconcile with our results. Political partisanship fully persists even for those who live in
zip codes within 2 miles of a four year university where information should be most readily available.
Instead, we nd a potential role for either or both of two possible mechanisms. First, the act of
registering impacts individual or group identity formation which persists even if Bayesian updating
is done properly. We call this identity or peer e¤ects. Second, the act of party registration impacts
the way that individuals lter news, leading the individual to conrm their original registration
decision. We call this conrmatory bias (Rabin and Schrag, 1999).
The contribution of this paper goes beyond the particular interests of social psychologists and
behavioral economists to those with a general interest in understanding policy. Our paper contributes
to two strands of the political economy literature. One strand has focused on why governments are
responsive to the needs of only some sections of the electorate. For instance, Dixit and Londegran
(1995, 1996) and Lindbeck andWeibull (1987) emphasize how the policy making process is responsive
to the needs of swingelectoral groups who have a relatively weak partisan attachment. Another
strand in the political economy literature has been preoccupied with the puzzle of the persistence
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of ine¢ cient economic policies (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Majumdar
and Mukand, 2004; Coate and Morris, 2000). We unearth a distinct mechanism that simultaneously
throws light on both these issues: namely, the persistence in political beliefs. In particular, if
voters are unwilling to shift political allegiance in response to new politically relevant information
then ine¢ cient policies are more likely to persist. Acemoglu et al (2010) argue that any kind of
incumbency advantage results in the persistence of bad governments and policies. We suggest that
in as much as incumbency advantage may arise due to the persistence of partisan attachments, we
can have bad governments and policies remain in place.
Our estimates suggest that a citizen-voters initial political a¢ liation can have important political
consequences. This is particularly true since we nd evidence to suggest that young voters are
particularly impressionable and susceptible to shocks. Consider the implications of our ndings when
applied to the 2008 US election. In this election according to Pew Research Center, amongst those
in the 18-29 category, 66% voted for Obama in 2008 as opposed to 53% in the general population. If
we then calculate the vote gap for Democrats between those becoming eligible to vote for the 2008
general election and those becoming eligible in 2000 when the youth gap was zero, our estimates of
persistence imply that it will take approximately 26 years to reduce this di¤erence down to a 1%
gap.
Finally, our paper makes a contribution to the regression discontinuity literature by introducing
a placebo-based inference method for computing standard errors. This method is useful when there
is serial correlation in the running variable or in the functional form bias.
In section 2, we discuss relevant literature. In section 3, we describe the data that we use. In
section 4, we present our empirical methodology. In section 5, we present our main ndings including
our estimates of the persistence of political partisanship. In section 6, we quantitatively as well as
qualitatively interpret our results; in particular, we reconcile our ndings with various theories of
belief and preference formation. Finally, in section 7, we conclude.
2 Related Literature
Certainly since the seminal work of Downs (1957), models of political behavior have assumed that
citizens are rational actors in their voting decisions. According to this rational choice view a
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citizens choice of political party is a function of a running tally of retrospective evaluations of
party promises and performance (Fiorina, 1981). According to this view, a citizen switches his
political party a¢ liation in response to information about the political party and changes in the
underlying environment. At rst glance, the persistence in a citizens political a¢ liation may be
considered to be inconsistent with this view. However, Achen (1992) and Gerber and Green (1998),
show that a rational Bayesian model is consistent with considerable persistence in a citizens political
party a¢ liation. Indeed this rational choiceview of citizens who process information and update
their political choices in a Bayesian manner underlies almost all formal models of the political process
in both economics and political science.
Probably the papers most closely related to ours are Alesina and Fuchs-Schudeln (2008) and
Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009). Alesina and Fuchs-Schudeln show that growing up in a Communist
political system directly a¤ected ideology, particularly towards redistribution. They show that East
Germans are more in favor of redistribution as compared to their West German counterparts. Our
paper di¤ers from theirs in three important ways. First, is the di¤erence in identication strategies.
Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln compare the evolution of political ideology between East and West
Germans controlling for income and demographic characteristics. In contrast, we compare political
a¢ liations of almost identical cohorts born a few days apart. Second, they do not attempt to throw
light on possible mechanisms which may explain the persistent divergence in political opinion. In
particular, we show that the mere act of registering for a political party has a persistent impact on
political a¢ liation; moreover, we then interpret our results in light of theories of belief formation.
The paper by Giuliano and Spilimbergo examines whether exposure to a recession or a boom when
young results has an impact upon beliefs about the role of luck in determining income and upon
preferences towards economic redistribution. Their analysis is similar to ours in that it focuses on
di¤erences across cohorts (time), while Alesina and Fuchs-Schudeln exploit spatial variation.
Whereas our paper is the rst to use the discontinuity in ability to vote at age 18 to estimate
persistence of political beliefs, the age-related discontinuity has been used to look at persistence in
voting (Meredith, 2009) as well as polarization of ideology (Mullainathan and Washington, 2009).
Meredith uses a regression discontinuity in the eligibility to vote in 2000 to estimate the e¤ect of
voting in the 2000 election on the probability of voting in 2004. His results are very similar to
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estimates of persistence in voting from the randomized Get Out The Vote experiments (Gerber,
Green and Shachar, 2003). Mullainathan and Washington (2009) was the rst paper to use the
discontinuity at age 18 to estimate the impact of voting on political preferences. They use survey
data to compare political attitudes of 20 and 21 year olds who had voted at least once to attitudes of
18 and 19 year olds who had not yet had the opportunity to vote. Their focus is political polarization.
They nd that the older cohort of 20 and 21 year olds has more extreme views than the 18 and
19 year old cohort. In contrast to our paper, the di¤erences across cohorts are plausibly due to
di¤erences in information. The older cohort on average has more education and may well have
also have spent time collecting information when they voted. Even in a world where information
collection is costly, opinions should not systematically di¤er across cohorts where the di¤erence in
age is extremely small.
Gerber, Huber and Washington (forthcoming) carry out an interesting eld experiment where
they examine whether political a¢ liations (partisanship) a¤ect political attitudes (ideology). They
direct a mass mailing to mobilize individuals with latentpreferences in favor of a political party
to register in the upcoming elections. They survey these individuals subsequently to examine the
change in political attitudes over a four month period and nd that political partisanship shapes
political attitudes.
In many ways, our paper is most closely related to an older tradition in political science that draws
on social psychology. In particular, Campbell et al. (1960) is an early critic of rational information
processing from the social psychology tradition and their classic study highlights the role of enduring
partisan commitments in shaping attitudes towards political objects. Recent expositions of this
argument is provided by Bartels (2002) and Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002). A distinctive
aspect of the current paper is that we analyze the role of alternative mechanisms that may result
in persistence in political partisanship. These include the behavioral literature on conrmatory bias
(Rabin and Schrag, 1999) as well as individual or group identity formation (Akerlof and Kranton,
2010).
Finally, we add to the literature on treatment e¤ects using a regression discontinuity design. We
estimate our results using Porters regression discontinuity estimator (Porter, 2003). We suggest a
new placebo-based method for computing standard errors that provides a solution to concerns about
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testing in the presence of functional form bias (Card and Lee, 2007) as well as serial correlation in the
outcome across the running (forcing) variable. As far as we know, serial correlation in the running
variable has not been previously been addressed by the regression discontinuity literature.
3 Data
Our main data source is an electronic copy of the universe of voter registration forms for the state
of California, collected rst in June of 2006 and then again in August of 2008. While examining
registration data is interesting in its own right, it would be interesting to also look examine voting
data. Not surprisingly, with the ballot being secret such individual level data is not available.
Furthermore, aggregate voting data does not contain precise information on individual birth dates,
which would prohibit the use the regression discontinuity design for identication. Nevertheless,
we observe that when we use precinct-level voting data we are able to show that the precinct-level
correlation between registration for a political party and Presidential voting is 0.92 for Democrats
and 0.91 for Republicans for 2004. 3 Therefore, registration behavior is a good proxy for voting
behavior.
The registration data contains the name of every individual registered in the state, a unique
individual numeric identier which allows for linkage of records over time, the registration date, of
birth, sex, and address (including 5-digit zip code). In practice, sometimes the reported date is the
date of rst registration; other times, it is the date of most recent registration. We see in the data
some people who moved and retained their old registration date and others who moved and their
registration date changed. This introduces measurement error if we try to use the registration date
as the date of rst registration.
Between the years 2000 and 2009, California had a closed primary system4. In addition, the data
reports party of registration for each individual. For most registrants, the party is either Democrat,
3Available for download at http://swdb.berkeley.edu/d00/g04.html and http://swdb.berkeley.edu/d00/p04.html
respectively.
4California recently adopted an open primary system for state-wide o¢ ces and for the House of Representatives
with the passage of state ballot proposition 14 on June 8, 2010. Party registration would still determine voting rights
for President; however, for all other o¢ ces, party registration would not determine voting ability.
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Republican or not recorded. However, a small percentage of voters also register with other parties.
One concern with estimating persistence using voter registration data is that party registration
may persist even if partisanship does not simply because voters dont re-register. Imagine that
9/11 had an impact on party of registration but no one re-registered afterwards. A regression
discontinuity would nd a persistent impact of 9/11 even if the e¤ect had died out. We therefore
estimate our e¤ects both on the universe of voters close to the birth date discontinuity and on a
subset of individuals whom we identify in the data as having moved. Voters usually re-register when
they move in order to be able to vote near their new address. We can identify movers in our data
as registrants whose street number changes between 2006 and 2008. We therefore construct a panel
in order to identify individuals who changed their registration because they moved. We use the
voter registration identication number to identify individuals. We check to see that individuals are
correctly matched. In 100% of cases, the birth date in 2006 matches the birth date in 2008. In
99.91% of cases, the sex also matches. In 17% of cases, individuals changed the numeric portion
of their street address. Even in the main sample, we limit registrants to those who are present in
both the 2006 data set as well as the 2008 data set. 26.5% of individuals registered in 2008 were not
registered in 2006.
For each individual in a given zip code, we extract the average value of census characteristics for
their listed zip code, which we use in placebo exercises. We extract the following variables: total
population, number living in an urban area, white, black, Native American, Asian, Latino, over
15, median income, number of households, number of families, and number below the poverty line.
Except for total population, we express all census variables in per capita terms by dividing by total
population in the zip code.
Finally, we use GIS software to create a dummy variable for all zip codes within two miles of
a Federal Congressional District boundary. California has 53 Congressional districts. We throw
out zip codes which cross Congressional District boundaries. Border zip codes are 44.5% of our
sample. We also create a dummy variable for all zip codes within two miles of a four year university.
We obtained data from the Thomson Corporation, which publishes the Petersons Guide to Four
Year Colleges5. There are 260 four year universities in the Petersons Guides listings for California.
5We thank Devin Pope for providing us with this data.
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Registrants living within two miles of a four year university are 56.3% of the sample.
4 Methodology
The key hypothesis examined is whether the mere act of registering for a political party increases the
probability of registering for that same party even many years later. Identifying such an e¤ect is not
straightforward. This is because party registration is correlated with other underlying determinants
of partisanship such as income, future expected income and political upbringing. If these other
underlying determinants of political partisanship and ideology are persistent over time (which they
are likely to be), then we can expect a positive correlation in political partisanship over time. To
make matters worse, most of these underlying determinants are not observable to the econometrician.
Accordingly, we address this endogeneity concern using the unforeseen political shock from the
September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre as a natural experiment. There are two
aspects of the experimental design that are key. First, we exploit the fact that a large number of
voters typically register for a political party for the rst time when they turn eighteen. In fact, in
the state of California, any citizen is allowed to register when they will be 18 by the next election. In
practice, many act as if they obtain the right to register right after they turn 18. We document this
registration behavior in the results section. Second, we argue that political partisanship is randomly
and di¤erentially assigned between those citizens who were likely to register just before 9/11 and
those likely to register immediately after.
Both conditions are necessary for our design. Without a discontinuity in the probability of
registering before versus after 9/11/01, there would be no di¤erent treatment and control groups.
Without the 9=11 shocks, there would be no treatment di¤erentially across the two groups. Together,
this double-discontinuity (in age and in the citizen information sets caused by the 9=11 event) allows
us to use a regression discontinuity design in birth date to identify the impact of initial registration
on the evolution of political preferences. We note that our approach of comparing individuals with
slightly di¤erent birth dates and discretely di¤erent probabilities of registering for the rst time after
9=11 is quite di¤erent from comparing those who registered just before versus after 9=11: Whereas
there is no fundamental reason why people with small di¤erences in birth dates should register
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di¤erently, it is quite plausible that 9=11 mobilized Republicans or demobilized Democrats and so
that there are underlying di¤erences between those who actually registered before versus after 9=11:
The basic idea of the design is simple. In order to identify the causal e¤ect of voter registration
today on the dynamic evolution of political partisanship, we need to consider exogenous di¤erences
in voter registration that are unrelated to the other determinants of a citizens political preferences.
Perceived restrictions on age of registration for elections provide one such variable. The cohort of
individuals who are likely to register to vote right before 9=11 should be identical to the cohort
of individual are likely to register immediately after. Accordingly, we assume that any di¤erences
across these two cohorts in the proportion of Republicans, Independents and Democrats can be
reasonably attributed to the informational content of (and emotional experience associated with)
the 9=11 shock itself.
However, a priori under the assumption that information processing (and re-registration) are
relatively costless, we should not expect any systematic di¤erences across these two cohorts in
subsequent years. In other words, as citizens update their information sets in response to new
information, their political a¢ liations should change. Accordingly, we should expect there to be
complete convergence in the political a¢ liations of otherwise identical cohorts in subsequent years.
One additional note which is relevant for our estimation design is that individuals are free to
register when they choose, as long as they are eligible. Since treatment status is not a deterministic
function of age, we cannot use a sharp discontinuity design. Instead, ours is a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design, where we exploit discontinuities in the probability of treatment conditional on
the citizens date of birth. Though we do not, estimate the impact of registration after 9=11, we in
essence use birth date as an instrument for date of registration.
4.1 Estimation Equations
We estimate the impact of birth after the discontinuity birth date in three di¤erent ways. In our
rst set of estimates, we use a linear probability model and regress party of registration dummies
on a birth date dummy:
Pit = a+ Dt + it (1)
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where Dit is a dummy variable for birth after August 31, 1983 and Pit is a dummy variable which
either takes on a value of one for Republican and zero otherwise, a value of one for Democratic
registrants and zero otherwise, or a value of one for Independents and zero otherwise depending
upon the regression. Here i indexes the individual and t the individuals birth date where the
discontinuity date is set to t = 0. Note that we do not index our variables by that the data was
collected (2006 or 2008) because we estimate our results separately for each sample year. We show
in the results section that there is a discontinuous jump in the probability of registration after
September 11, 2001 for those born after August 31, 1983 versus on or before August 31 1983. We
show and discuss this in the results section. August 31, 2001 is the Friday before labor day and 10
days before Tuesday, September 11, 2001. We both show the discontinuity graphically and estimate
it formally.
In our second specication, we better control for the functional form of the relationship be-
tween the independent variable and the running variable by including linear trends in birth date
di¤erentially before and after the discontinuity. We estimate:
Pit = a+ Dt + B (1 Dt) (C   t) + ADt (t  C) + it (2)
where C is the cuto¤ birth date. B and A are coe¢ cients for the trends in registration over
time before and after the discontinuity date respectively.
Our third specication attempts to improve controlling for the functional form of the relationship
between the dependent variable and birth date. We use a semi-parametric estimator due to Porter
(2003). Porters approach is to estimate the coe¢ cient for the jump (dummy) variable controlling
for a non-parametric estimate of the outcome variable where the outcome variable is itself a function
of the jump variable. The explicit estimation of the jump variable leads to a
p
N rate of convergence
of the discontinuity estimate. This rate of convergence is faster than rates from non-parametric
regression discontinuity estimates and thus does not have the same asymptotic bias problems. We
estimate:
min

NX
i=1
2666664Pit   dit  
NX
j=1
K (tj   ti)
NX
r=1
K (ti   tr)
(Pjt   djt)
3777775
2
(3)
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where ti is the birth date of the ith individual and K is an Epanechnikov Kernel function.
We then consider additional checks on our specications due to remaining concerns about (1.)
imperfect ability to capture the functional form, especially given discrete data and (2.) bias in
standard errors due to serial correlation both in the underlying data as well as due to functional
form error. Card and Lee (2007) assume that error in functional form would induce positively
correlated errors at a point in the running variable but serially uncorrelated across the running
variable. Their suggestion, in our case, amounts to clustering on date. However, functional form
bias can cause serial correlation over time in addition; also, the underlying data can be serially
correlated. In this case, the Card and Lee correction will not be su¢ cient6. Therefore, we compute
standard errors using a placebo distribution of regression discontinuity estimates. We do this both
for the linear trends model detailed in equation (2) and for the Porter estimator detailed in equation
(3). We are additionally worried about time varying heteroskedasticity. If day to day shifts in
average vote shares for a party is greater in periods right around September 11, 2001, then it is
possible that the day to day changes are large due to higher volatility, not a shift in average public
opinion. Therefore, we additionally, estimate a distribution of placebo of t-statistics corresponding
to the placebo of the mean estimate.
Since our data is discrete (by birth date), we inherently do not have an actual discontinuity.
Therefore, the underlying model for regression discontinuity estimation does not exactly match our
data. As a robustness check, we therefore also compute the average di¤erence in party registration
rates across the days surrounding the discontinuity7:
!^ =
Nt0+1X
i=1
Pi;tz+1
Ntz+1
 
Nt0 1X
j=1
Pj;tz+1
Ntz 1
(4)
where Ntz is the sample size at date tz where tz = 0 is the placebo discontinuity date for placebo
sample z: We are still concerned with time varying heteroskedasticity. Therefore, we additionally,
estimate the standard deviation of daily uctuations in party registration rates over a twenty day
window surrounding the placebo discontinuity dates. We exclude the three dates over which the
6 In a future version of this paper, we will show this both analytically as well as through simulations.
7Note that this simple average could also be estimated using a Porter estimator with a uniform Kernel and bandwidth
equal to one.
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placebo discontinuity e¤ect, !^; is estimated. We report the percentile of the standard deviation for
the 9/11 e¤ect relative to the placebo standard deviation distribution.
Our nal and main specication is the estimation of persistence. We regress party of registration
in 2008 on party of registration in 2006, instrumenting for birth on or after 9/1/83. Note that we
have a somewhat more complicated set up than a traditional instrumental variable setup:
Birth after 9/1/83 ! Registration after 9/11/01 !
Republican Registration in 2006 ! Republican Registration in 2008
Since we are interested in the impact of party of registration in 2006, instrumented by small dif-
ferences in date of birth, on party of registration in 2008, we bypass the second step and directly
estimate registration in 2006 with birth after 9/1/83:
Birth after 9/1/83 ! Republican Registration in 2006 ! Republican Registration in 2008
We estimate in two di¤erent ways: the two stage least squares method with separate linear trends
on each side of the discontinuity and the two sample IV method using the Porter estimator. Our
two least squares estimation equations are given by:
(EQ2) P 2008it = + P
2006
it + 
2
B (1 Dt) (C   t) + 2ADt (t  C) + it (5)
(EQ1) P 2006it = + Dit + 
1
B (1 Dt) (C   t) + 1ADt (t  C) + it
where P kit is the party of registration for individual i who is born on date t and appears in the voter
registration sample from year k.
The main coe¢ cient of interest is : One potential concern with the estimation of  is the
stationarity of the error term. If, for example, it = it 1 + t, then standard errors will generally
be incorrect if asymptotic convergence is through T ! 1. Moreover, if  > 1; inference is not
possible without a transformation of the data. However, we use cross-sectional data to identify a
time series parameter: limN!1 T = 2. In other words, the number of individuals I !1 as N !1
and since we reasonably assume that it is identically and independently distributed over individuals
i; we can use the central limit theorem to invoke convergence of averages of our residuals to a stable
normal distribution. In other words, we invoke the Central Limit Theorem using cross-sectional
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variation where the error term is stationary and, in fact, distributed i.i.d. If the error term is non-
stationary in the time dimension, this does not pose a problem for the computation of our standard
errors.
A second potential issue which arises with the estimation of the persistence parameter, , is the
di¢ culty, originally noted by Heckman (1978), in distinguishing state persistence from unobserved
hetereogeneity. Without full persistence, this is a problem associated with panels which are small
in the time dimension. Individuals with high propensities to be in a given state are also more likely
to be in that state initially. In other words, the initial state is not randomly assigned and is in
fact correlated with the xed e¤ect. Thus, the estimate of persistence can be confounded with the
estimation of the xed e¤ect. In a long panel with a stationary degree of persistence, a consistent
estimator of the xed is obtained and the persistence parameter can be properly estimated. Of
course, our sample includes only two time periods. Nonetheless, due to the regression discontinuity
in birth date, our initial state is quasi-randomly assigned and thus not correlated with the xed
e¤ect. In other words, since we instrument initial party registration with birth date before versus
after 9/1/01, initial party a¢ liation is unlikely to be correlated underlying propensities to a¢ liate
with a given political party. Our estimates thus do not su¤er from the traditional bias problems.
This remains true even if the process is fully persistent.
We also estimate persistence using the two sample IV estimator introduced by Angrist and
Krueger (1995) using estimates of  from the Porter regressions. The two sample IV estimator is
the ratio of the rst stage divided by the reduced form. In other words it is estimate of the impact
of birth after 9/1/83 on registration for a party in 2008 divided by the estimate of the impact of
birth after 9/1/83 on registration for a party in 2006:
2008
2006
(6)
We bootstrap the standard errors with 1,000 replications to construct condence intervals. Di¤erent
from the two stage least squares IV estimator which is biased in small samples towards the OLS
estimator, the two sample IV estimator is biased towards zero.
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4.2 Bandwidth Selection
We pick the bandwidth using a cross-validation procedure. We compare our results to those from
a four degree polynomial. We estimate separately above and below the discontinuity and within
a 100 birth day window on either side of September 1, 1983. We nd the minimum mean squared
integrable error occurs at a bandwidth of 23 for Republican registration, 36 for Democratic reg-
istration, and for independent registration8. In all cases, mean integrable squared error seems to
follow a quadratic pattern as a function of bandwidth, rst falling and then rising. Rather than
using di¤erent bandwidths for di¤erent variables, we choose a uniform bandwidth of 30 which we
use to determine the size of our estimation sample in our OLS regression and as the bandwidth in
our Porter regressions across all dependent variables. Our results do not qualitatively vary with
bandwidth though sometimes signicance of variables other than registration after 9/11/01 and
Republican registration do depend upon the bandwidth.
5 Main Results
5.1 Discontinuity in Registration After 9/11/01
We now turn to the results. We begin by showing that there is a discontinuity in the probability of
registration after 9/11/01 for those born on or after 9/1/83, relative to those born just before. We
estimate the Regression Discontinuity in three di¤erent ways and report each of them in Table II.
First we put in a dummy for 18th birthday occurring after 9/1/01. Second, we control for di¤erential
linear trends in birth date separately on either side of the discontinuity. Third, we implement the
Porter estimator9. We estimate the latter two specications both on the full sample as well as on
a sample of movers who changed their registration address between 2006 and 2008. In our OLS
estimates, we cluster on county. We also try the Card and Lee (2007) correction, which in our
case amounts to clustering on birth date. Though results were similar across the two specications,
standard errors were actually slightly larger when clustering on county. In both cases, standard errors
were similar to unclustered standard errors, suggesting that functional form mis-specication main
8We thank Douglas Almond, Joseph Doyle, Amanda Kowalski, and Heidi Williams for sharing their Stata code
which implements the cross-validation procedure.
9We thank Douglass Miller for posting his .do le which implements the Porter estimator online.
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not be a concern for our particular regression discontinuity design. We choose the more conservative
option of reporting standard errors clustered on county. Given the number of counties, it follows
that the number of clusters is 52.
The discontinuity is estimated by the regression with registration after 9/11/01 as the outcome.
There is a clear shift at the discontinuity (see Figure II). The shift is somewhere between six and
seven percentage points and t-statistics are generally above ten for the main sample (see Table II).
There is a slightly smaller discontinuity (between ve and six percentage points) in the sample of
movers and t-statistics are between four and ve. The decrease t-statistic size are mainly caused
by a smaller sample size. As we show in Table I, movers make up approximately 17% of total
number of registrants in our sample. The OLS linear trend estimates are similar to those using the
Porter estimator. We use this discontinuity to look at long run impacts of decisions at the age of
political maturity of choice of political party in the short run and the medium run. Discontinuities
in registration after a date approximately 18 years after the birthday are common. Moreover, the
discontinuities are often, though not always around 10 days after a birth cohorts birth day. We
demonstrate this in Figure III where we shift 9/11/01 backwards as well as forwards in time by
intervals of 100 days, starting with a -500 day shift and ending with a +500 day shift and then
estimate probabilities of registering after the shifted date by birth date.
Democrats and Republicans may be more likely to be born at di¤erent times of the year. If in fact
partisanship varies systematically by birth date, it can make it problematic to estimate the impact
of registration for a party on future registration for that party. We rst check to see whether in fact
this is a concern. We use a sample of all registered voters in the state of California from 1971 to the
present. We regress a dummy for party of registration on year dummies and month dummies. For
Democrats, we nd four individual month dummies signicant at the 5% level and one additional at
the 10% level. The winter months are Democratic and the summer Republican. The month dummies
are jointly signicant at the 0.01% level. The maximum di¤erence in partisanship is from January
to May and is 0.59%. For Republicans the results are very similar with a maximum di¤erence of
0.58% between March and November and the month dummies are jointly signicant at a 0% level to
four digits. We e¤ectively control for monthly di¤erences in demographics which determine political
preferences, by looking at small di¤erences in birth dates.
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A more serious issue that we face is that voting is optional in the United States, which implies
that not everyone registers to vote. Approximately 72% of potential registrants are actually regis-
tered10. One potential worry with our design is thus that 9/11 mobilized Republicans or demobilized
Democrats born after 9/1/83. We address this in multiple ways. First, we show that the density in
the number of registrants is continuous around the discontinuity of rst registration after 9/1/01.
Therefore, there was no net persistent demobilization or mobilization of voters. Formally, we per-
form the McCrary11 test for a discontinuity and are unable to reject the null hypothesis of density
continuity. The t-statistic for the test is 0.0655 (and 1.1496 for a sample of registrants who moved
between 2006 and 2008). We also non-parametrically plot (Figure IV) the density for registration
separately by birth date and by registration date. Visually, the density of registrants by birth date
looks at in the vicinity of 9/1/83.
5.2 Estimates of Impact of Registration After 9/11 on Party of Registration
In the next step we use regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of birth after 9/1/01
on party of registration: in practice we estimate whether the voter is registered as a Republican,
Democrat or an Independent. In our analysis we count as an Independent anyone who is not
registered as either a Republican or a Democrat. In 2006, approximately 93% of those registered
were in one of these three categories; the others were registered with smaller parties such as the Green
Party, the American Independent Party and the Libertarian Party. In 2006, 38% of Californians
born after 1970 were registered Democrat, 28% as Republican and 34% were not registered with
either major party.
We show estimation results in Table II. In general, the results for the simple dummy model
(equation (1)) are di¤erent from the trend controls (equation (2)) and the Porter model (equation
(3)) estimates. However, the trend controls and the Porter model estimates are quite similar to
each other, suggesting that a linear trend most likely accounts for most of the endogeneity due to
partisanship trends over time. For the full sample, the increase is only signicant at a 5% level
for e¤ect on Republican registration in the trend control model. Birth after 9/1/83 increases 2006
Republican registration by 2.5 percentage points in the local trend model and 2.2% in the Porter
10See http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf, p. 2.
11We thank Justin McCrary for making his .do le available online.
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model. Both are signicant at the 5% level though the local trend estimate is also signicant at the
1% level. The estimates in the 2008 data sample are very similar in magnitude: 2.3% in the trend
control model and 1.9% in the Porter model, with both being signicant at the 10% level and the
trend control estimate also being signicant at the 1% level. The numerical results are conrmed in
Figures IIIA (Republicans), IIIB (Democrats), and IIIC (Independents).
The movement towards the Republican party subtracts both from the Democratic Party and
from independents. However, neither estimates are signicant at conventional levels in 2006. The
2008 impact in 2008 is -1.6% in both the local trend and Porter estimates and is signicant at the
10% level using the Porter model.
The results for movers are somewhat di¤erent from the results for the full sample and in inter-
esting ways. The estimated e¤ects are substantially larger: approximately 6.2% both in 2008 and in
2006 for the Porter model and 6.8% and 6.5% respectively for the trend control model. All estimates
are signicant at the 5% level and the 2008 estimate using the trend control model is signicant
at the 1% level. Di¤erent from the results for the full sample, the e¤ects are almost of equal size
though opposite in sign for the independents. The estimates for independents are -6.0% in the 2006
trend control model and otherwise within 0.2% of -5.0%. All estimates are signicant at the 10%
level. The point estimates for Democrats are very small and insignicant in all specications across
both samples of Democrats.
What accounts for the di¤erences in magnitudes across movers and the full sample, as well as the
di¤erences in e¤ected political parties? Movers are demographically distinct from the full sample.
Looking at table V, movers are more likely to be from zip codes with more whites and smaller
populations. They also are more likely to have chosen the Republican party as an alternative
to registering independent as opposed to registering Democrat. Consistent with Zallers (1992)
hypothesis about who is impacted by the media, those impacted by the 9/11 shock are likely to be
somewhat more highly educated whites living in more urban areas. We will return to the issue of
who was impacted and why in the section 6.
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5.3 Census and Gender Placebos
In addition to running regressions with registration after 9/11/01 and choice of political party as
outcome variables, we also run a number of placebos. Even though we nd no net mobilization or
demobilization of voters born just after 9/1/83, we are still concerned that 9=11 could have mobilized
latent Republicans and demobilized latent Democrats born just after 9/1/83 and in roughly equal
proportions. To address this concern, we run placebos on the voter characteristics and characteristics
of voterszip codes for those born on either side of the birth date discontinuity.
We test run regressions with 13 placebo outcomes. 12 of the 13 placebo outcomes are census
averages for the zip code of the registrant. The other outcome is the registrants gender. Our census
placebo variables include total population, fraction urban, fraction White, fraction Black, fraction
Latino, fraction Native American, fraction Asian, fraction over 15, median per capita income, number
of households per capita, number of families per capita, and the poverty rate. Table III shows that
none of the placebos is signicant at the 5% level. Only gender is signicant at the 10% level and only
in the mover sample. Therefore, 9/11 was unlikely to have permanently mobilized or demobilized
voter registration.
5.4 Robustness Checks
We now present our robustness checks to deal with serial correlation across the running variable and
specication bias. The rst of these is that we break up the running variable into non-intersecting
blocks, each 60 days in length. We then estimate placebo regression discontinuities on the placebo
days in the middle of the di¤erent blocks and report the percentile of the true value in the dis-
tribution compromised of the placebo discontinuities and the true value. We estimate 90 placebo
discontinuities starting with individuals born in January, 1971. Of course, in the presence of time-
varying heteroskedasticity, it is possible that the true discontinuity estimate has a larger e¤ect just
due to higher variance in the true discontinuity block. Therefore, we report p-values both for the
distribution of estimates and the distribution of t-statistics. For the impact of birth on Republican
registration, our true estimate was larger than any of the other 90 estimates. However, one of the
90 placebo blocks did have a larger t-statistic though with a negative mean impact. In addition,
the p-value for the e¤ect on Democratic registration was 0.09 though the p-value for the t-statistic
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distribution was considerably lower at 0.21. We graph the distributions in Figure VI. The impacts
on independent registration are not close to signicance at any conventional levels. In Figure VII,
we also graph the distribution of the census placebos and self-reported gender. We do nd two out
of 13 signicant at a 10% level though none at the 5% level. Also, none of the distributions of the
t-statistics are signicant at a 10% level.
As an additional check on functional form bias, we estimate the simple di¤erence estimator in
equation (4). The benet of this estimator is that it formulates a hypothesis which conforms to the
data and thus does not su¤er from functional form bias. However, since the change is estimated
using a small number of points, it is a high variance estimator. Since we are again concerned about
serial correlation in heteroskedasticity, we break up the running variable into non-intersecting blocks
of 20 days and estimate 271 placebo changes in addition to 271 placebo standard deviations of the
outcome variable over the placebo windows. We compute the standard deviations excluding the days
over which the change is computed. Instead of taking the change between the day and the day before
the discontinuity, we look at a two day change. Our results are quantitatively and qualitatively very
similar to the one day change. The change for both Republicans and Democrats are signicant at
the 5% level though not the 1% level. The mean estimate for Republicans is a change of 4.6% and
for the Democrats a change of -6.9% putting the changes into the 97.8 percentile and 1.1 percentile
of the respective placebo distributions. The standard deviations were at the 63.6 percentile and 19.1
percentile of the Republican and Democratic placebo standard deviation distributions, reinforcing
that the increase in Republican voting and decrease in Democratic voting is not due to an increase
in cross-day variability in party of registration around 9/11.
5.5 Estimates of Persistence
In table VI, we estimate our main specication: the degree of persistence. We regress party of
registration in 2008 on party of registration in 2006, instrumenting party of registration with birth
after 9/1/01. We do this with both the full sample and the mover sample and in two ways: with
OLS and with the Porter estimator.
Before presenting our instrumental variables estimates, we rst provide some evidence whether
on our instruments monotonicity. This is important in order to be able to interpret the IV estimates
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as a local average treatment e¤ect of people likely to switch party a¢ liation due to the 9/11 event.
We bootstrap our estimates with 1,000 replications. Only three of our 1,000 bootstrap estimates
for the impact of birth after 9/1/01 on Republican voting are negative and only 21 for the impact
on Democratic registration were positive. This is in contrast to the independents, for whom 48.4%
were negative and 51.6% were positive.
For the OLS estimates, we include linear trends in birth date di¤erentially before and after
9/1/01 as an included instrument. Our sole excluded instrument is birth after 9/1/01. In four out
of six cases, we can reject the null hypothesis of no persistence but in no cases can we reject the
null of full persistence. In the other two cases, the rst stage F-statistics are below one. Moreover,
our precise estimates are all within 0.1 below one and 0.25 above one. In particular, the estimates
for Republicans are 0.938 for the full sample and 1.072 for the movers sample. The Republican full
sample estimate is the only one with a rst stage F-statistic above 10. Since weak instruments can
lead to estimates that are biased towards the OLS estimate and can also lead to incorrect test sizes,
we also estimate using the Porter estimator. We use a simple two sample IV, bootstrap the standard
errors with 1,000 replications where we report the percentage of bootstrapped estimates below zero
as our p-values. The p-values are generally higher with the two sample IV, potentially due to weak
instruments and small sample bias. However, in our four precisely estimated cases, the two sample
IV estimates look quite similar to the 2SLS IV estimates. All the two sample IV estimates except
for the full sample independent voter estimate are within 0.2 of one. The estimates for Republicans
are 1.166 for the full sample and 1.013 for the movers sample. The Democrat full sample estimate
is 0.935. All three of these are signicant at the 5% level. In addition, the Independent voter mover
samples point estimate is 1.020 and is signicant at the 10% level.
We do not show results of the impact of 9/11 on party of registration because the impact of
birth date on registration after 9/11 is underestimated. Sometimes, when citizens re-register, their
registration date remains the same and other times, the registration date changes. Unfortunately,
this depends upon policies of local counties. Since a much larger percentage of those born before
9/1/83 registered just before 9/11/01, re-registration lowers the measured e¤ect of birth after 9/1/83
on 9/11/01. This leads to some unreasonable results. We can see this from a two sample IV of the
impact of registration after 9/11 on Republican registration. This is obtained by dividing the impact
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of birth after 9/1/83 on party of registration by the impact of birth after 9/1/83 on registration after
9/11/01. We shows some simple calculation focusing on our benchmark of impact on registration
for the Republican party.
Using Porter estimates, which are similar to the results using the linear control model, in 2006,
we estimate that registration after 9/11 increases Republican registration by 33%; for movers, the
impact is much higher: 113%. Between 2006 and 2008, the estimates for the impact on Republican
registration do not change much, consistent with full or near full persistence. For the sample as
a whole, the decline in the estimated impact is 14%; for the movers, the estimated change in the
impact is 0%. In contrast, there is a marked decline in the measured impact of birth after 9/1/83
on registration after 9/11/01. For the full sample, the point estimate declines by 27% and for the
movers, who are more likely to change their registration, the point estimate declines by 47%. 35% of
movers in have a registration date in 2007 or 2008 in the 2008 data set. Therefore, the estimates of
the impact of registration after 9/11/01 on Republican registration increase dramatically to 40% for
the full sample and 214% for movers. So, whereas our design is useful for estimating the persistence
of party a¢ liation, it only provides an upper bound estimate of the impact of registration after 9=11
on party of registration.
6 Interpretations
We now try to better interpret our ndings. First, we look at which groups (age and region)
responded to the 9/11 shocks. Then, we discuss the quantitative impacts of our ndings dynamically
over time. Finally, we use our ndings to understand models of belief formation.
6.1 Responses to Information
This subsection documents who reacted to the 9/11 political shock. We look across age and parti-
sanship of region of residence. We check whether our results are consistent with Converses (1976)
hypothesis that the young are much more subject to inuence by news. Similarly, we also check the
consistency of our ndings with Zallers (1992) theory that those who are subject to inuence by
news are those who pay attention, but are not as partisan.
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6.1.1 Age
We examine whether the 9/11 shock had a much larger impact on the political registration behavior
of 18 year olds than those in the age group 25 to 60. We mainly focus on the younger age group for
two reasons. The rst and most important is that there is a discontinuity in registration probability
when people turn 18. This is critical for our identication strategy because it randomizes, within
the group of 18 year olds, those who register rst after 9/11/01 (and thus are more likely to initially
register Republican) and those who register rst before 9/11/01 (and thus are initially more likely
to register Democrat). However, another benet of looking at 18 year olds is that individuals at
this age are particularly open to political persuasion. There is a large literature which says that
political ideas are formed in early adulthood and afterwards ideas stabilize and become harder to
change (Converse, 1976). Therefore, older adults may, in general, be less likely to be inuenced by
political events. Because they have lower variance political priors, they may be less likely to react to
a political shock in the short or the long run. More recent research has challenged this view (Green,
Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). To look at this issue, we run additional specications, concentrating
on people who were between 25 and 60 years old on 9/11/01, and who re-registered to vote within
a 30 day window of September 11, 2001.
We run the Porter regression of Republican registration, Democratic registration and independent
registration on date of registration with a discontinuity date of 9/11/01. We only report the results
in the text. We do nd an impact on Republican registration,which is remarkably similar magnitude
to our benchmark estimate of 18 year olds: 2.2%. The e¤ect is signicant at the 1% level. Whereas
we see a small and statistically insignicant impact on Democratic registration (-0.05%), the impact
on registration as an independent is -1.7% and signicant at a 5% level. However, we have to be
careful in comparing these estimates to our estimates for 18 year olds. The estimates for 18 year
olds were estimates of the impact of birth date, not registration date on Republican registration.
As discussed in Section 5.5, our estimates for the impact of registration after 9/11 on Republican
registration is 33%; it is estimated to be 113% for the movers subsample. Of course, these estimates
have an upward bias due to a downward bias in the measurement of the impact of birth after 8/31/83
on registration after 9/11/01. However, even for the full sample of 18 year olds, the estimated impact
would have to fall by an order of magnitude in order to be even close to the impact for those older
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than 25. This would imply an impact of birth after 8/31/83 on registration after 9/11/01 of over
50%, which is implausible.
Moreover, we are concerned about the endogeneity of our ndings for the older population.
Whereas Republican 18 year olds can not shift their birth date in response to 9/11, Republicans can
di¤erentially re-register after 9/11. To check for potential endogeneity, we run a Porter regression
on sex and year of birth. Those registering just after 9/11/01 are 0.6 years older on average, and
the e¤ect is signicant at even a 0.1% level of condence. Additionally, we perform the McCrary
test for continuity of registration around 9/11 and are able to reject at a 1% level of condence.
Accordingly, we conclude that the impact of the 9/11 shock seems to have had a much larger impact
on 18 year olds than on those between 25 and 60, consistent with Converse (1976).
6.1.2 Partisanship By Region
Where information is more available, we expect less persistence. Information availability depends
upon both the demand side and the supply side. Later, we will look at the demand side (zip codes
near universities). We now look at the supply side. We look at more partisan and less partisan
districts. We examine the impact of 9/11 in pro-Democratic, Republican and swing districts. Ac-
cordingly, we split our sample into the top third most Democratic, the top third most Republican
and the remaining third in the middle according to aggregate Congressional vote share in the Con-
gressional District. The Democratic districts have Republican vote shares of less than 32.5%. The
Republican districts have a Republican vote share of greater than 64%. The swing districts then
have Republican vote share between 32.5% and 64.0%. Table VIII shows that in all three types
of districts, there is a large and signicant impact of birth on or after 9/1/83 on registration after
9/11/01. The magnitude is around 6-7% in all cases for 2006. The largest impact on the Republican
vote share is in the Democratic districts. It is 4.5%, and signicant at a 95% level of condence.
The e¤ect in the Republican districts is slightly smaller at 3.9%, but is not signicant at even a
90% condence level, partially due to the smaller sized e¤ect and partially due to higher standard
errors. Note that the sample size for the sum of three types of districts is signicantly smaller than
the overall sample size. This is due to zip codes which cross Congressional District boundaries and
thus get dropped. In the swing districts there is not much movement in vote share from 9/11. Also
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note that the e¤ect on Democrat vote share is larger in magnitude than the e¤ect on Republican
vote share in the Democratic areas. People who otherwise would have registered Democrat instead
register Independent as well as Republican. This is di¤erent from the Republican areas, where there
was a movement towards the Republican party from both the Democrats and the Independents. We
note that where we have signicant e¤ects (the Democratic districts) in 2006, we have signicant
e¤ects of a similar magnitude in 2008, once again conrming full, or close to, full persistence across
the population.
Since Republican, Democratic and swing potentially attract very di¤erent types of individuals,
we restrict our sample to people registered in zip codes within 2 miles of a Congressional District
boundary. We then break up our sample into zip codes in a district which had a close House of
Representatives election in 2002 or 2004. We compare our results in these competitive districts to
similar districts within 2 miles of a Congressional District boundary in lop-sided races. We dene
close races as races where the two party vote share was less than 55% and greater than 45% for
the two parties. All other races we dene to be lop-sided. Figure VII is a map of the state of
California with electoral district boundaries in red and zip codes within two miles of a Congressional
District boundary in blue. We throw out zip codes which cross Congressional District Boundaries.
The estimation results are shown in Table VII. We only nd an impact of 9/11 in the lop-sided
districts where political parties are the least active. However, the null e¤ect in close election areas
is somewhat illusory. We do not nd an impact of birth after 9/1/83 on registration after 9/11/01.
This could be in part due to competitiveness of political parties in reaching out to 18 year olds and
mobilizing them to register right at their birth day. We nd an equally large e¤ect of birth after
9/1/83 on registration in the non-border areas as in the close election border areas. However, there
is no signicant impact of 9/11 on Republican registration in 2006. The point estimates are 0.014, as
opposed to 0.043 in the lop-sided districts. Border zip codes are more rural, wealthy, and ethnically
white (Table VI). Many of the non-border areas are in close election districts, potentially explaining
the lack of a signicant e¤ect in those areas. This lack of persistence of the 9=11 shock in competitive
districts suggests that political persistence is not driven by costly information processing.
Unfortunately, more independent areas did not react to the 9/11 shocks and so we can not use
di¤erential response by degree of party competition to make inference about the role of information
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availability in generating persistence. However, the fact that there was an impact of 9/11 in both
Democratic and Republican areas but not in areas which are more mixed is itself quite interesting. It
suggests either of two possible interpretations: (1.) those in the middle are less interested in politics
and thus do not react to new information or (2.) they react less because both parties are active in
ltering information which moderates the impact of news. This latter interpretation is consistent
to Zallers (1992) theory that individuals who are knowledgeable are less inuenced by news. Zaller
focussed on demand-side determinants of knowledge. However, political parties may play a role as
well on the supply side. This would be an interesting area for future research.
6.2 Magnitudes
We showed that an individuals initial choice of political party persists and we can not reject that
it persists indenitely - at least for the set of voters whose political a¢ liations were a¤ected by the
September 11 attacks.12 We should point out that our estimates cannot rule out the possibility that
there is heterogeneity in persistence in which some voters persist indenitely and others persist a
su¢ ciently small amount of time that the switchers had already switched by 2006 when we rst
collected registration data. There is a large long run di¤erence between full persistence horizon and
90% persistence over two years much less 60% over 2 years. Whereas all of the condence intervals
for our persistence estimates include full persistence (a coe¢ cient of 1.0), they all also include a
two year persistence between 0.8 and 0.9. We should point out that heterogeneity in persistence is
consistent with our ndings. For example, it is possible that preference shocks persist indenitely
for some members of the electorate while for others, persistence is so small that the switchers had
already switched by 2006 when we rst collected registration data.13
The range of numbers within our 95% condence interval. There is a large long run di¤erence
between full persistence over a two year horizon and 90% persistence over two years much less 60%.
Our analysis suggests that the length of time required to reduce the average partisan gap by an
12Furthermore, the degree of persistence in political partisanship is even more striking if we account for the possibility
that the group of registrants a¤ected by 9/11 were if anything, less ideologically partisan before their birth date.
13We should point out that our estimates cannot rule out the possibility that there is heterogeneity in persistence
and that some voters persist indenitely and others persist a su¢ ciently small amount of time that the switchers had
already switched by 2006 when we rst collected registration data.
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order of magnitude (to 10 percent of the initial gap) is quite long. In particular, a 2 year persistence
coe¢ cient of 0.6 implies that it takes 10 years, a coe¢ cient of 0.8 implies 22 years, 44 years with a
coe¢ cient of 0.9, and 460 years with a coe¢ cient of 0.99. On average, convergence never happens
with a coe¢ cient of 1.0.
Given this persistence, it is possible that a president who is popular with the young can have a
large impact on election outcomes years into the future. For instance, according to Pew Research
Center, amongst those in the 18-29 category, 66% voted for Obama in 2008 as opposed to 53% in
the general population14. In contrast, since 1980, the youth gap had never been higher than 6%.
Moreover, 18-29 year olds accounted for 17% of the electorate. That is roughly a 2.3% impact on
the vote share. Vote share di¤erences in US Presidential elections have been below 2.3% almost once
a decade: 4 times since 1960. In 1960, the Kennedy defeated Nixon by 0.1%; then in 1968, Nixon
defeated Humphrey by 0.7%. In 1976, Ford lost to Carter by 2.1%; nally, in 2000, Bush won over
Gore with an aggregate vote share di¤erential of -0.5% (though a majority of the electoral votes).
Moreover, if we take our lowest point estimate for Republican persistence (the party for which we
have the greatest precision), it is 0.938. If we then calculate the vote gap for Democrats between
those becoming eligible to vote for the 2008 general election and those becoming eligible in 2000
when the youth gap was zero, it will take approximately 26 years to reduce down to a 1% gap.
Estimates of full persistence do not at all preclude switching. In fact, in our main sample of people
born within 30 days of 9/1/83, 2.6% switch from Republican to Democrat and 4.3% switch from
Democrat to Republican. Unsurprisingly, the numbers are larger in magnitude for movers. 7.9% of
movers switch from Republican to Democrat and 12.1% switch from Democrat to Republican15. How
are these results of substantial switching reconcilable with our ndings of full or near full persistence?
The answer is that they measure very di¤erent things. Lets examine the case of full persistence.
People born just after 8/31/83 are more likely to have initially registered Republican than people
born just before. Individuals may switch from Republican to Democrat or vice versa. However,
14See http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1031/young-voters-in-the-2008-election.
15Alternatively, we could have estimated hazard models. However, given the measurement error in registration date,
the results would not have been terribly meaningful. Therefore, we could have only reasonably estimated hazard rates
o¤ of the di¤erence between the 2006 data sample and the 2008 data sample. Reporting simple transition probabilities
seemed a more parsimonious approach given our data limitations.
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this will not happen di¤erentially across the birth date threshold. Therefore, the average di¤erences
between those born on either side of 9/1/01 will remain despite random individual switching. In
other words, there will be no mean reversion from the 9/11 shock in the aggregate population.
6.3 The Persistence of Political Partisanship: Possible Mechanisms
We now use our estimates of persistence to help us better understand models of belief formation. A
range of potential theories may help explain aspects of persistence of partisanship. We discuss each
of them in turn, be it costly information acquisition or processing, social e¤ects or cognitive biases.
1. Bayesian Learning & Persuasion: Our persistence results are incompatible with models of strict
Bayesian learning. Any di¤erences in beliefs across Bayesian learners must be due either to di¤erences
in priors (Acemoglu, Chernozhukov and Yildiz; 2009) or due to di¤erences in information. However
our RD design allows us to rule out that di¤erences in priors is the culprit. On average, we should not
expect priors to di¤er across groups of people who are born a couple of days apart. Could di¤erences
in information at the time of initial registration account for long run di¤erences in partisanship?
9/11 was a large enough political event that rational Bayesian individuals registering di¤erently
because they were born a few days apart should not have di¤erent posteriors about politics after
9/11. Moreover, they also should not systematically seek di¤erent information sources.
Nevertheless, since parties send out information to their registered voters, it is possible that
the two di¤erent groups could passively receive di¤erent information. Kamenica and Gentzkow
(forthcoming) show that a biased source can manipulate a rational Bayesian updaters decision by
choosing what massages to send. In particular, they show that it is possible for a Democratic news
source to persuade rational Bayesian updaters to register Democrat by sending signals which most
of the time convince the voter that the Democratic candidate is better and a small percentage of
the time convince the voter that the Republican candidate is much better. In a new working paper,
Kamenika and Gentzkow (2010) show that media consumers become fully informed when two media
sources with opposing viewpoints both send messages. So their argument relies on large costs of
information acquisition. We turn to that particular mechanism next.
2. Costly Information: If information collection or processing costs are an important source for
persistence, we should expect greater political persistence amongst those individuals who nd it
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costlier to collect or process information. For instance, better educated individuals, or those who
are located where education levels are higher are likely to have lower costs of processing politically
relevant information. We examine this by looking at zip codes within 2 miles of a 4 year university.
These zip codes are enclosed by red lines in the map of the state of California shown in Figure
VI. University zip codes tend to be somewhat poorer, less likely to have people under 15, are more
urban, and have a higher density of African Americans (Table VI). Somewhat surprisingly, there
are similar impacts of birth on or after 9/1/01 on registration after 9/11/01 in the university and
non-university areas (Table VII). However, there is only an impact on party of registration in the
university zip codes. The impact on Republican registration is 3.1% and signicant at the 5% level,
even with the smaller sample size. There are no signicant impacts on either registration as an
independent or as a Democrat. The point estimates are negative for impacts on both Democrats
and independents and roughly equal in size but they are not signicant in either case. Moreover, the
point estimate for Republicans is even larger in 2008 than in 2006, suggesting full persistence. Since
we nd full persistence even in university areas, we are inclined to disfavor channels that emphasize
costly information collection or costly information processing.
3. Social E¤ects and Identity: One possibility is that an individuals pre-existing set of friends
strongly inuences political party choice. Our experimental design rules out this type of simple
peer e¤ect. It is unlikely that prior to registering for a political party, individuals systematically
preferred to associate with only those others who were born on either side of an arbitrarily chosen
date. This is especially true given that we are looking at such small di¤erences in the date of birth.
In contrast, registering for a political party may help crystallize an identity. This may result in
political persistence if this identityresults in an identity costof switching political parties (Akerlof
and Kranton, 2010).
4. Cognitive Biases: Cognitive factors may also help explain political persistence. In particular, our
ndings are consistent with conrmatory bias (Rabin and Schrag, 1999) where an individual pays
selective attention or interprets information so as to conrm her initial priors. First impressions may
a¤ect memory recall or alter subsequent information ltering. This is closely related to the idea of
cognitive dissonance - where registering for a political party may make the individual psychologically
vested in that decision. The individual will, then, process information that favors his initial choice
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of party - resulting in political persistence.
Our ndings, are also consistent with explanations which are mixtures of both cognitive and
social biases. We give a couple of examples. First, there are peer group e¤ects. People choose
to form friendships based at least in part upon politics. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) show, using
survey data, that whereas media exposure is not very segregated across Democrats and Republicans,
friendships are much more segregated; moreover, political discussions mostly happen between people
with very similar politics. People may retain the same public political partisan leanings because doing
otherwise would be socially costly. However, this is not enough to explain registration behavior.
People who change their partisanship could lie to their pre-existing friends. However, cognitive
dissonance combined with peer group e¤ects could easily explain persistence. Another possible
channel is what DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) call persuasion bias- where individuals fail
to account and adjust for repetition of information that they may receive. For example, individuals
may belong to and socially interact with a Democratic group in university. However, information
processing will be biased if an individual treats information received from his endogenously chosen
social network as independent. However this cognitive bias is again not enough in and of itself.
Individuals must rst form social networks with people of similar partisan leanings.
Accordingly, we argue that the balance of the evidence seems to suggest that the persistence
in political partisanship is driven mainly by some combination of social identity e¤ects and cog-
nitive biases. There is much less support for rational Bayesian arguments, information processing
arguments or pre-existing social networks.
7 Conclusion
Does the mere act of a¢ liating with a political party increase chances of a¢ liating with that same
party in the future? If so, how long does the impact of original a¢ liation persist? We answer these
questions by looking at di¤erences in initial party registration behavior of 18 year olds who happened
to register to vote for the rst time just before versus after September 11, 2001 due to small di¤erences
in birth date. The 9/11 attacks were on the one hand, a large enough political event to have had
an impact and, on the other hand, unforeseen so that those registering just before 9/11 were not a
select group. In particular, individuals registering in the state of California for the rst time before
31
9/11/01 did not know about the bombings when they registered and those registering immediately
after did. Our results are quite striking. We nd that on average the 9/11 attacks moved registrants
towards the Republican party by over two percentage points. Moreover, the initial choice of political
party persists and we can not reject the hypothesis that it persists indenitely. This persistence
in political partisanship is surprisingly extreme, especially accounting for the fact that most likely,
relatively less partisan sets of individuals had their politics a¤ected by 9/11. Our ndings have
important implications for the study of political economy. They provide another channel for policy
persistence; policies may persist simply because support for a party persists.
We explore possible reasons to account for this political persistence. We nd full persistence for
those registered in zip codes within two miles of a four year university - suggesting that information
availability is unlikely to be a factor. We do nd, however, no impact of 9/11 in highly politically
competitive areas, consistent with Zallers (1992) notion that the informed are not inuenced by
news. We also nd full persistence for independents, suggesting that the electorate is potentially
broken into groups of partisans and non-partisans. This nding has strong implications for models
of voting behavior such as the probabilistic voting model. Whereas our ndings are di¢ cult to
reconcile with Bayesian models of political inference, including ones allowing for costly information
acquisition or costly cognitive computation, we nd our results consistent both with theories of
conrmation bias and political identity formation.
We hope that future work will be better able to identify the groups who are particularly subject
to political news shocks. Are the elderly less susceptible to inuence than the young? What role
does education play? We would also like to see if taking a political stance leads to persistence for the
entire population instead of just those who are susceptible to news shocks. In addition, we hope to
see further clarication on whether persistence in political beliefs is due more to individual political
identity formation, social group pressure or whether it is more for cognitive reasons. Understanding
persistence is important not only for understanding human behavior and belief formation but also
for understanding how public policy evolves.
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Full Sample
10 Days 5503 5508 11574 49.98% 538 4.65%
20 Days 11159 11279 23001 49.73% 1607 6.99%
30 Days 16743 16978 34284 49.65% 3144 9.17%
40 Days 22113 22617 45293 49.44% 4956 10.94%
50 Days 27778 27958 56299 49.84% 6838 12.15%
Mover Sample
10 Days 976 930 2000 51.21% 76 3.80% 17.28%
20 Days 1936 1917 3947 50.25% 221 5.60% 17.16%
30 Days 2889 2828 5811 50.53% 440 7.57% 16.95%
40 Days 3837 3790 7721 50.31% 695 9.00% 17.05%
50 Days 4841 4667 9602 50.92% 970 10.10% 17.06%
% Reg Around 
9/1/01
Table I
Numbers of Registrants Over Varying Birth Windows
Notes: (1.) Columns list numbers of registrants born just before and after 9/1/01 for various window sizes (there is a discontinuity in probability of 
registration after 9/11/01 at 9/1/01), (2.) Share Born Before is the share of those born before 9/1/01 in the sum of those born before 9/1/01 and those born 
after 9/1/01, (3.) The total window also includes those born on 9/1/01, (4.)  Movers restricts the sample to registrants who changed their recorded address 
between 2006 and 2008.
Num. Born 
Before 9/1/01
Num. Born 
After 9/1/01
Total Born in 
Window
 Share Born 
Before
Mover 
Share
Num. Reg. 
Around 9/1/01
Outcome Year Dummy Movers
Reg. After 9/11 2006 0.103*** 0.067*** 0.058*** 0.066*** 0.055***
(0.0064) (0.0052) (0.0117) (0.0065) (0.0150)
Reg. After 9/11 2008 0.073*** 0.048*** 0.029*** 0.048*** 0.029***
(0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0078) (0.0054) (0.0094)
Republican 2006 0.014*** 0.025*** 0.065** 0.022** 0.062**
(0.0035) (0.0063) (0.0258) (0.0107) (0.0260)
Democrat 2006 -0.012* -0.012 -0.005 -0.015 -0.012
(0.0051) (0.0090) (0.0193) (0.0113) (0.0272)
Independent 2006 -0.002 -0.013 -0.060* -0.007 -0.051*
(0.0051) (0.0092) (0.0232) (0.0114) (0.0275)
Republican 2008 0.010*** 0.023*** 0.068*** 0.019* 0.062**
(0.0036) (0.0068) (0.0250) (0.0106) (0.0252)
Democrat 2008 -0.009* -0.016 -0.016 -0.016* -0.012
(0.0052) (0.0095) (0.0203) (0.0114) (0.0279)
Independent 2008 -0.001 -0.007 -0.052* -0.003 -0.050*
 (0.0048) (0.0097) (0.0202) (0.0113) (0.0272)
N 34,288 34,288 5,801 34,288 5,801
OLS Y Y Y N N
Trend Controls N Y Y N N
Mover Sample N N Y N Y
Clustered on County Y Y Y N N
Notes: (1.) All regressions are in a 30 day window surround the birthdate 9/1/01, (2.) Dummy is a simple regression of the outcome variable on a 
dummy for birth after 9/1/01, (3.) Trend controls allows for linear controls in time separately before and after 9/1/01, (4.) Movers restricts the 
sample to registrants who changed their recorded address between 2006 and 2008, (5.) The final two columns show the results of the Porter 
Estimator for the full sample and for movers respectively, (6.) Standard errors are clustered on county for the OLS regressions, (7.) Year refers to 
the year of the sample, (8.) Reg. After 9/11 is a dummy variable which takes on one if the voter's recorded day of registration is after 9/11/01, (9.) 
Republican refers to registration of the Republican Party, Democrat refers to registration for the Democrat party, and Independent refers to 
registration for neither of the two major parties, (10.) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table II
Impact of Birth After 9/11/83 on Registration Date and Party of Registration
Local Poly.: 
Movers
Local 
Polynomials
Trend 
Controls
Census Variables
Total Population -566 -1,047 -566 -1047
(605.8) (754.1) -492.5 -1111.7
Gender 0.012 0.051 0.012 -0.055*
(0.0126) (0.0374) (0.0139) (0.0327)
Urban 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.0042) (0.0067) (0.0034) (0.0077)
White 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.004
(0.0079) (0.0126) (0.0061) (0.0137)
Black -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.001
(0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0049)
Native American 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Asian 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.0021) (0.0041) (0.0027) (0.0057)
Latino -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005
(0.0039) (0.0110) (0.0055) (0.0118)
Over 15 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.0011) (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0036)
Median Income -0.59 0.513 -0.590 0.513
(0.6270) (0.9880) (0.6827) (0.7995)
Num. Households 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0014) (0.0034) (0.002) (0.004)
Num. Families 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0020)
Poverty -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.001
(0.0025) (0.0053) (0.0021) (0.0048)
N 34,288 5,801 34,288 5,801
Table III
Census Placebos
OLS w/ Trends OLS: Movers
Local 
Polynomials
Local Poly. : 
Movers
Notes: (1.) All regressions are in a 30 day window surround the birthdate, (2.) OLS regressions allow for linear controls in time separately before and after 
9/1/01, (3.) Movers restricts the sample to registrants who changed their recorded address between 2006 and 2008, (4.) The final two columns show the 
results of the Porter Estimator for the full sample and for movers respectively, (5.) Standard errors are clustered on county for the OLS regressions, (6.) 
LHS variables are census averages of demographics at the county level except for Gender which is from the voter's registration form, (7.) *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Total 9/11 Changes Rank Percentile
Mean (Republican Change) -0.001 272 0.046** 6 97.79%
Mean (Democrat Change) 0.000 272 -0.069** 269 1.10%
Mean (Independent Change) 0.001 272 0.023 48 82.35%
SD (Rep. Change) 0.105 272 0.106 99 63.60%
SD (Dem. Change) 0.140 272 0.132 220 19.12%
SD (Ind. Change) 0.126 272 0.133 69 74.63%
Inference Using Running Variable Placebos
Table IV
Notes: (1.) Mean is the average change over two days for the number of voters registering Democrat, Republican and Independent over 272 
different pairs of days from 1970 to 2006; the days are themselves spaced 20 days apart, (2.) SD is the mean of the standard deviation of the 
variable over the 20 day period omitting the days over which the variable change is computed, (3.) 9/11 Change is the change from August 31 
to Sept 2, (4.) Rank is the rank of the change around 9/11 compared compared with the other 271 date pairs, (5.) Percentile is the percentile 
rank of the 9/11 change, (6.)  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Summary 
Statistics
Republican Republican Democrat Democrat Independent Independent
Outcome Full Sample Movers Full Sample Movers Full Sample Movers
IV: 2SLS 0.938*** 1.072*** 1.222*** 3.518 0.409 0.900***
(0.1514) (0.2615) (0.3185) (14.7076) (0.8415) (0.2535)
1st Stage F Stat. 12.5513 4.8911 2.9378 0.0375 0.6879 5.7105
IV: Porter 1.166** 1.013** 0.935** 0.986 2.369 1.020*
P-Value 0.010 0.032 0.026 0.282 0.256 0.078
Notes: (1.) All regressions are in a 30 day window surround the birthdate 9/1/01, (2.) All 2SLS regressions regress the dummy for party 
(Republican, Democrat and Independent) membership in 2008 sample on the party dummy from the 2006 sample with two included instruments 
(linear trends differentially before and after 9/1/01) and one excluded instrument (birth after 8/31/01), (3.) Porter IV estimates are the ratio of the 
2008 Porter estimates for a party divided by the 2006 Porter estimates (i.e. a two sample IV estimate), (4.) Standard errors for the Porter IV 
estimates are bootstrapped with 1,000 replications, (5.) P-values are the bootstrapped estimates below zero, (6.) Standard errors are clustered on 
county for the OLS regressions, (7.) Movers estimates restrict the sample to registrants who changed their recorded address between 2006 and 
2008, (8.) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table V
Persistence Estimates
Moved Univ. Border Close Race Moved Univ. Border Close Race
Repub. 0.008 -0.091*** 0.021 0.098** Total Pop. -2,026*** 4,433*** -5,944*** -4178
(2006) (0.0125) (0.0206) (0.0191) (0.0465) (723) (1647) (1696) (4410)
Dem -0.011 0.053*** -0.007 -0.004 Gender -0.093*** -0.014*** 0.009 0.028*
(2006) (0.0082) (0.0192) (0.0184) (0.0365) (0.0062) (0.0049) (0.0060) (0.0155)
Indep. -0.010 0.030* -0.012 -0.076** Urban -0.0023 0.064*** -0.031*** -0.073*
(2006) (0.0139) (0.0155) (0.0107) (0.0377) (0.0059) (0.0136) (0.0081) (0.0423)
Repub. -0.015 -0.088*** 0.018 0.086* White 0.060*** -0.043 0.074** 0.011
(2008) (0.0121) (0.0196) (0.0186) (0.0456) (0.0171) (0.0363) (0.0292) (0.0853)
Dem 0.025** 0.058*** -0.006 -0.010 Black -0.005 0.033* -0.011* -0.024
(2008) (0.0108) (0.0182) (0.0190) (0.0375) (0.0049) (0.0197) (0.0060) (0.0177)
Indep. -0.010 0.030* -0.012 -0.076** Native 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.002** 0.001
(2008) (0.0139) (0.0155) (0.0107) (0.0377) American (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0014)
Asian -0.014*** 0.036** -0.026*** -0.014
(0.0027) (0.0164) (0.0057) (0.0252)
Latino -0.044*** -0.026 -0.040 0.023
(0.0133) (0.0306) (0.0272) (0.0628)
Over 15 0.011*** 0.021** 0.015*** -0.031***
(0.0037) (0.0079) (0.0040) -0.0106
Median -0.097 -1.708** 2.115** 4.349
Income (0.4384) (0.7676) (0.8296) (5.4961)
Num 0.021*** 0.018** 0.018*** -0.019
House (0.0043) (0.0069) (0.0046) (0.0126)
Num -0.001 -0.012*** -0.001 0.013***
Families (0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0047)
Poverty -0.001 0.009 -0.005 0.024
(0.0043) (0.0160) (0.0113) (0.0181)
Observ. 34,228 34,228 34,228 15,242 34,228 34,228 34,228 15,242
Table VI
Mean Comparisons
Notes: (1.) Reported coefficients are from an OLS regression of an outcome variable (rows) regressed on a dummy variable (columns), (2.) Moved is a dummy for the sample of 
mover across zip codes; Univ.is a dummy for voters registered in zip codes within 2 miles of a university; Border is a dummy for voters registered within 2 miles of a 
Congressional District Border; Close Race is a dummy for the subsample of border zip codes where the House Race was won by less than 5% points, (3.) Variables on the Right 
Panel are census averages for a registrant's zip code with the exception of Gender which is the registrant's actual gender, (4.) Standard errors are clustered on county, (5.)  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Non-Border University Non-Univ.
Outcome Zip Codes Zip Codes Zip Codes
Reg. > 9/11 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.007 0.046*** 0.048***
(2006) (0.0066) (0.0077) (0.0356) (0.0065) (0.0076)
Reg. > 9/11 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.007 0.046*** 0.048***
(2008) (0.0066) (0.0077) (0.0356) (0.0065) (0.0076)
Republican 0.014 0.043** -0.012 0.031** 0.010
(2006) (0.0142) (0.0173) (0.0662) (0.0137) (0.0168)
Democrat -0.004 -0.038** 0.020 -0.015 -0.013
(2006) (0.0151) (0.0184) (0.0648) (0.0155) (0.0166)
Independent -0.010 -0.005 -0.008 -0.015 0.003
(2006) (0.0152) (0.0186) (0.0518) (0.0154) (0.0168)
Republican 0.012 0.043** -0.004 0.034** -0.001
(2008) (0.0141) (0.0172) (0.0658) (0.0136) (0.0167)
Democrat -0.009 -0.033* 0.018 -0.023 -0.006
(2008) (0.0152) (0.0186) (0.0652) (0.0156) (0.0167)
Independent -0.003 -0.010 -0.014 -0.011 0.007
(2008) (0.0151) (0.0185) (0.0524) (0.0153) (0.0167)
N 19,046 14,168 1,074 19,296 14,992
Table VII
Heterogeneity of Effects: Competitive Electoral Districts, Universities, and District Partisanship
Notes: (1.) All regressions use the full sample of registrants born within a 30 day window surrounding the birthdate 9/1/01, (2.) All 
regressions use the Porter Estimator, (3.) Non-border zip codes refers to the sample of all registrants in zip codes which are not within 
two miles of a Congressional District boundary; Zip codes within two miles of a Congressional District boundary are split into Lop-
Sided Elections, where vote margins of victory are less than 10% and Close Elections where vote margins of victory were less than 
10%, (4.) University Zip Codes are zip codes within two miles of a 4 year university; Non-University Zip Codes are zip codes within 
two miles of a university,  (5.) Zip codes for estimates by partisan leaning which cross Congressional District boundaries are dropped, 
(6.) Year refers to the year of the sample, (7.) Reg. After 9/11 is a dummy variable which takes on one if the voter's recorded day of 
registration is after 9/11/01, (8.) Republican refers to registration of the Republican Party, Democrat refers to registration for the 
Democrat party, and Independent refers to registration for neither of the two major parties, (9.) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Close 
Elections
Lop-Sided 
Elections
Dem. Dist. Swing Dist. Rep. Dist. Dem. Dist. Swing Dist. Rep. Dist.
Outcome Year Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Movers Movers Movers
Reg. After 9/11 2006 0.063*** 0.067*** 0.059*** 0.031 0.020 0.107***
(0.0174) (0.0185) (0.0156) (0.0354) (0.0447) (0.0311)
Reg. After 9/11 2008 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.013 0.024 0.061***
(0.0144) (0.0152) (0.0136) (0.0202) (0.0276) (0.0211)
Republican 2006 0.045** 0.013 0.039 -0.015 -0.059 0.135**
(0.0226) (0.0299) (0.0297) (0.0523) (0.0728) (0.0642)
Democrat 2006 -0.069** -0.014 -0.029 -0.009 0.099 -0.007
(0.0311) 0.0295 (0.0275) (0.0719) 0.0718 (0.0601)
Independent 2006 0.024 0.002 -0.010 0.024 -0.040 -0.142**
(0.0309) (0.0286) (0.0292) (0.0718) (0.0702) (0.0637)
Republican 2008 0.047** -0.003 0.025 -0.005 -0.065 0.089
(0.0225) (0.0297) (0.0295) (0.0497) (0.0705) (0.0625)
Democrat 2008 -0.072** -0.004 -0.028 0.010 0.146** 0.041
(0.0312) (0.0297) (0.0279) (0.0728) (0.0733) (0.0622)
Independent 2008 0.025 -0.006 0.002 -0.006 -0.081 -0.129**
 (0.0307) 0.0285 (0.0291) (0.0707) (0.0706) (0.0640)
N 4,988 5,041 5,216 900 873 1,095
Notes: (1.) All regressions are in a 30 day window surround the birthdate 9/1/01, (2.) All regressions use the Porter estimator, (3.) Democratic Districts 
are the third most Democratic Congressional Districts; they are districts with Republican vote share less than 32.5%; Swing Districts have in between 
32.% Republican vote share and 64.0% Republican vote share; Republican Districts are the most Republican districts and have Republican votes share 
greater than 64.0%, (4.) Zip codes which cross Congressional District boundaries are dropped, (5.) Year is the year of the sample, (6.) Reg. After 9/11 is 
a dummy variable which takes on one if the voter's recorded day of registration is after 9/11/01, (7.) Republican refers to registration of the Republican 
Party, Democrat refers to registration for the Democrat party, and Independent refers to registration for neither of the two major parties, (8.) *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table VIII
Heterogeneity Across Democratic, Swing and Republican Districts
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